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NOTE 
 
IT’S NOT A “GET OUT OF JAIL FREE” CARD: PROSECUTING 
INTERNATIONAL SEX CRIMES WHEN THE VICTIM DOES NOT 
TESTIFY 
 
Christiana Johnson†
ABSTRACT 
 The United States court system has many safeguards in place to protect the 
rights of both the victim and the defendant. But what if those safeguards fail to 
keep the parties safe? In cases of international sex crime, the victim is often 
unable to testify. If the court finds victims’ critical statements inadmissible due 
to hearsay or Confrontation Clause concerns, the perpetrator remains “safe” 
from punishment. Ironically, in many of those instances, the very policies on 
which the hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause were built are not 
achieved. This Note analyzes how prosecutors can use current hearsay 
exceptions to admit critical statements made by an unavailable witness. It also 
discusses Confrontation Clause concerns at length, in order to provide 
prosecutors the necessary history and policies behind the Clause to respond to 
concerns presented in court. Finally, the Note proposes that the Federal courts 
adopt an exception to hearsay for victims of international sex crimes.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sex crimes against children rage rampant.1 United States citizens are 
 
†  Christiana Johnson, Juris Doctor Candidate, Liberty University School of Law, May 
2020. Thank you Professor Tchividjian for proposing this idea to me and more importantly 
fueling the fire within me to advocate for the victimized. An enormous thank you to my family 
and friends, without whom I would not have made it through law school. All glory to my 
Savior, Jesus Christ, who has called me to “proclaim liberty to the captives.” 
1.   See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1, 55–60 (2018), 
https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-trafficking-in-persons-report/. The report addresses sex 
(and labor) trafficking and its prosecution on a global scale. Id. at 55–60. In 2017, there were 
24,138 identified victims of sex trafficking, and only 1,733 prosecuted in Africa. Id. at 55. In 
that same year, between East Asia and the Pacific, there were 10,819 victims and 2,949 
prosecutions. Id. at 56. In Europe, there were 12,750 victims and 2,548 prosecutions. Id. at 57. 
In the Near East, there were 1,834 victims and 974 prosecutions. Id. at 58. In South and Central 
Asia, there were 40,857 victims and 8,105 prosecutions. Id. at 59. In the Western Hemisphere, 
which includes the United States, there were 10,011 victims and 1,571 prosecutions. Id. at 60. 
Other sex crimes rage rampant as well: The World Health Organization has reported that “One 
in 5 women and 1 in 13 men report having been sexually abused as a child.” Child 
Maltreatment, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-
sheets/detail/child-maltreatment.  
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commonly found among the perpetrators.2 While legislatures have 
strategically implemented several laws to combat these crimes,3 the laws 
prove futile if prosecutors do not use them. For example, the PROTECT Act 
provides jurisdiction to prosecute United States citizens who commit sex 
crimes against children outside the United States.4 But the Act is worthless if 
not used by prosecutors to hold perpetrators accountable.  
However, executing these laws may prove difficult. “Translating 
legislation into meaningful action demands dedication, focus, and resources 
and requires that those implementing it truly understand both the underlying 
letter and the spirit of the law.”5 While perhaps preferable to prosecute the 
crime in the country in which it occurred, host countries may fail to do so.6 
When a United States citizen commits sexual abuse in a foreign country, and 
 
2.   Basyle Tchividjian argues that “United States citizens are sexually victimizing a large 
number” of the children abused overseas. Basyle J. Tchividjian, Catching American Sex 
Offenders Overseas: A Proposal for a Federal International Mandated Reporting Law, 83 
UMKC L. REV. 687, 712 (2015). He notes that United States citizens’ travel to foreign countries 
in recent years has grown and that “many United States citizens temporarily or permanently 
reside in foreign jurisdictions.” Id. at 713 (footnotes omitted). In a 2004 article by Katherine 
Breckenridge, she cited to the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 
that estimated that “over 250,000 sex tourists visit Asia every year, with twenty-five percent 
coming from the United States and thirteen percent from Australia.” Karen D. Breckenridge, 
Justice Beyond Borders: A Comparison of Australian and U.S. Child-Sex Tourism Laws, 13 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 405, 413 (internal citations omitted). See also Daniel Edelson, Note, The 
Prosecution of Persons Who Sexually Exploit Children in Countries Other Than Their Own: A 
Model for Amending Existing Legislation, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 483, 484–85 (2002). 
3.   See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1, 6 (2019), 
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf 
(“[I]n just two decades, 168 governments have implemented domestic legislation criminalizing all 
forms of human trafficking whether the crime happens transnationally or nationally.”).  
4.   Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
5.   See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1, 6 (2019), 
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-
Report.pdf. 
6.   A country may not prosecute:  
     [I]f the conduct in question is not prosecutable under the host state’s 
laws. The host state may have a stricter standard of proof for crimes such 
as rape, may impose an unduly light sentence for the offense, may be 
barred from prosecuting by its own statute of limitations, or may not 
regard certain conduct, such as child abduction or fraud, as criminal. The 
host state may fail to prosecute for reasons based on the nationality of the 
parties involved, or on the cost of prosecution. 
Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 41, 57 (1992) 
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that country does not prosecute, the United States should step in to ensure 
justice. While prosecuting a crime that occurred on foreign soil may not be 
ideal due to evidentiary challenges,7 it is an important step in the 
administration and assurance of justice for the victimized.  
Prosecuting sex crimes within the United States poses unique challenges. 
More specifically, “testimony and other evidence reveals that prosecutors 
must approach these cases differently from more traditional criminal cases 
since victims may be unavailable, unwilling, or in too much danger to 
testify.”8 When these same crimes occur outside the United States, these, and 
other logistical issues, arise. Unique challenges confront the prosecutor, 
especially in regard to evidence9 and acquiring witnesses.10 This Note will 
attempt to provide helpful arguments for prosecutors to use when the child-
victim of an international sex crime is unable, unwilling, or unavailable to 
testify.  
First, this Note considers hearsay exceptions relevant to international sex 
crime cases. It analyzes various cases that discuss hearsay exceptions to 
determine how prosecutors may successfully enter necessary statements 
from the victim into evidence. This analysis assists in determining which 
current exceptions may be effective for prosecutors and whether the current 
exceptions effectuate the policies behind the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
Second, this Note discusses the Confrontation Clause, outlining the 
evolution of relevant case law and pertinent exceptions. While the 
prosecution of international sex crimes must prove effective, it must also 
maintain fairness for the defendant. Similar to the analysis of hearsay 
exceptions, a discussion of Confrontation Clause issues will assist in 
determining which out-of-court statements may be entered into evidence 
and whether current case law achieves the purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause.  
 
7.   Id. at 54–55 (noting that prosecution in the state in which the crime occurred makes the 
most sense, since “it ensures that the offender’s trial takes place near the scene of the crime 
(thus minimizing evidentiary problems), and avoids a conflict of jurisdiction with the host 
state.”).   
8.   See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONFRONTING COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
AND SEX TRAFFICKING OF MINORS IN THE UNITED STATES 219 (Ellen Wright Clayton et al. eds., 
2013). 
9.   See, e.g., Heather C. Giordanella, Status of 2423(b): Prosecuting United States Nationals 
for Sexually Exploiting Children in Foreign Countries, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 133, 154 
(1998) (“Holding a trial close to where the offense occurred enables law enforcement to collect 
necessary evidence to prosecute the offender.” (citations omitted)). 
10.   Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 41, 73 (1992) (“Securing the attendance of a witness from 
abroad, particularly one who is recalcitrant, raises difficult problems.” (citations omitted)). 
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Third, the Note hypothesizes solutions for admitting victim statements if 
the victims in United States v. Durham had not testified. The Note considers 
hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues surrounding the case. This analysis 
is meant to help apply the previous discussion in the Note to a similar set of 
facts in order to demonstrate how the arguments may pan out in a real case.  
Finally, this Note proposes an exception to the prohibition on hearsay. Not 
only does the exception ensure that the policies behind the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause are satisfied, it enables prosecutors 
to hold defendants accountable for the heinous crimes they commit overseas. 
The exception provides a new layer of protection for children across the globe 
and accountability for perpetrators. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Manners are mostly associated with saying “please” and “thank you.” 
When someone has bad manners, usually he or she failed to communicate 
those pleasantries, open a door for another, or speak politely. The girls in 
Upendo Children’s Home used the phrase “bad manners” to describe the 
sexual abuse they suffered at the hands of Mr. Durham, a missionary who 
was staying at Upendo.11 After more than a month of staying there, the 
manager of Upendo, Ms. Wambugo, walked into one of the rooms and saw 
that Durham was in bed with one of the girls.12 The girls told Wambugo that 
they had “been doing bad manners” with Durham.13  
After this discovery, several of the volunteers confronted Durham.14 At 
first, he claimed that he did not remember, but once alone with Wambugo, 
he admitted to the sexual acts.15 After returning to the group, he again said 
he could not remember.16 Within a few weeks, he flew back to the United 
States, but before he left, Durham consented to a recording of his statement 
confessing what he had done.17 Durham also wrote down a detailed account 
of how he abused the children at Upendo.18  
At trial, five of the eight alleged victims testified, “including the victims 
associated with each of the four convictions.”19 A medical expert testified for 
 
11.   United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1189–90 (10th Cir. 2018). 
12.   Id. at 1190. 
13.   Id.  
14.   Id. 
15.   Id.  
16.   Id.  
17.   Durham, 902 F.3d at 1190. 
18.   Id. 
19.   Id. at 1191.  
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the prosecution, and the court admitted Durham’s recorded and written 
statements into evidence.20 The jury convicted Durham of four counts of 
“traveling in foreign commerce and engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a 
minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c).”21 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the 
convictions, along with the sentence of 480 months in prison.22 
United States v. Durham demonstrates the utility of the Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 
2003 (PROTECT Act).23 The purpose of the PROTECT Act, as noted in 
Durham, is to “combat the multibillion dollar international sex trafficking 
market.”24 The PROTECT Act amended the statute under which Durham 
was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), in 2003.25  
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c): “Any United States citizen . . . who travels in 
foreign commerce, or resides, either temporarily or permanently, in a foreign 
country, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.”26 As 
defined under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f), “illicit sexual conduct” is “a sexual act” 
with a minor that violates chapter 109A if it happened in the “special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” “any commercial 
sex act . . . with a person under 18 years of age,” or “production of child 
pornography.”27  
In Durham, under the PROTECT Act and § 2423, the Federal Government 
had the authority to prosecute Durham’s crimes.28 The girls at Upendo will 
 
20.   Id. 
21.   Id. The jury also convicted Durham of three more counts of violating § 2423(c), which 
the district court acquitted Durham of “because the Government had not shown Mr. Durham 
engaged in ‘sexual conduct’ as defined by the statute . . . .” Id. at 1192.   
22.   Id. at 1240, 1192.   
23.   Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today 
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
24.   Durham, 902 F.3d. at 1197. 
25.   Id. at 1196.  
26.   18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2018).  
27.   18 U.S.C. § 2423(f) (2018). 
28.   Durham, 902 F.3d. at 1192. Durham contested the constitutionality of the statute, 
alleging “noncommercial illicit sexual activity abroad has no relation to foreign commerce.” 
Id. However, after surveying what the lower courts had stated on the matter, the court held 
that the PROTECT Act still gave Congress jurisdiction over noncommercial sex acts, such as 
the ones Durham engaged in. Id. at 1216. More specifically, the court stated that when 
Congress passed § 2423(c), it “had a rational basis to conclude it was regulating activity that 
substantially affects foreign commerce. In particular, it could reasonably decide that foreign 
travel followed by noncommercial sex with minors—in the aggregate—substantially affects 
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suffer from the effects of Durham’s abuse for years to come. While a 480-
month sentence does not undo the abuse Durham committed, it provides 
some accountability for his actions and it, hopefully, sends a message that sex 
crimes are to be taken seriously, whether they occur domestically or 
internationally.  
Despite the United States having jurisdiction to prosecute both 
commercial and noncommercial international sex crimes, there are 
evidentiary and constitutional issues that arise when considering prosecuting 
these crimes. In Durham, several of the victims testified at trial.29 Incredibly, 
not only did five of the eight alleged victims testify, but these five included 
“the victims associated with each of the four convictions.”30 Thus, in regard 
to the victims’ testimony, no Confrontation Clause or hearsay issues arose.31 
However, many times, when perpetrators travel overseas and commit 
abuse, it may be nearly impossible to find the victim, or, if found, transport 
them to the United States to testify.32 Without the victim, prosecutors may 
hesitate to further investigate or prosecute the crime. If the government still 
prosecutes without the victim’s presence, the prosecution must navigate both 
Confrontation Clause concerns and hearsay rules in order to admit their 
statements into evidence.  
 The PROTECT Act and 18 U.S.C. § 2423 provide prosecutors with an 
avenue by which to prosecute international sex crimes. Indeed, between the 
passage of the PROTECT Act and 2008, “there have been 65 convictions of 
 
the international market for sex tourism.” Id. Thus, whether the sexual act is commercial or 
noncommercial in nature, under § 2423 and the PROTECT Act, prosecutors can hold 
defendants accountable for abuse they commit overseas. Id. 
29.   Id. at 1191. 
30.   Id.  
31.   At least in regard to the appeal, the defendant did not raise any hearsay or 
Confrontation Clause issues regarding the victims’ testimony. Id. at 1192, 1217, 1222, 1225, 
1230, 1233, 1236, 1239 (noting the issues on appeal included the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423(c), a Brady Claim, some of the Defendant’s statements, alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct, authentication of cell phone videos, medical records of victims, sentencing, and 
cumulative error regarding the alleged prosecutorial misconduct and the Brady claim).  
32.   Giordanella, supra note 9, at 152–53 n.157 (1998) (“Since the United States would 
encounter difficulty in flying child witnesses to the United States to testify at trial, the 
government may depose the children or introduce tes-timony via satellite. The Confrontation 
Clause, however, prohibits the use of foreign depositions unless the deposed is unavailable and 
the testimony appears reliable. . . . In addition, testimony via satellite in the United States may 
present a Confrontation Clause objection if the defendant is unable to question his accuser.” 
(emphasis added) (referencing Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for 
Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 41, 55 (1992)).  
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child sex tourists.”33 Prosecuting these crimes “to the fullest extent possible” 
is a key way that the Government can combat sex crimes against children.34 
However, a victim’s failure to testify presents incredible difficulties for 
prosecutors. While current hearsay exceptions provide some solutions for 
admitting critical statements, they may not always prove sufficient. In order 
to ensure the policies the legislature relied upon in promulgating the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, Congress should pass a new exception for these cases. In 
so doing, Confrontation Clause concerns must also be analyzed and 
answered.  
III.  WHO SAID SO, ANYWAY?: UTILIZING CURRENT HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 
WHEN THE VICTIM OF AN INTERNATIONAL SEX CRIME DOES NOT TESTIFY 
Before considering a new exception to the rules of hearsay,  it is important 
to consider the utility of those currently in place. There are a number of ways 
that current hearsay exceptions may be used to admit out-of-court 
statements. The following analysis presents those exceptions that seem most 
applicable to international sex crime scenarios.  
A.   Federal Rule of Evidence 801: Definitions and Exclusions 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, if the statement is not being offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay.35 While this hearsay rule 
seems rather elementary, there are several instances in which a prosecutor 
may creatively use this exception to admit a statement that would assist in 
proving the defendant’s guilt. United States v. Al-Maliki provides just such 
an example.36  
In Al-Maliki, a jury found the defendant guilty of sexually abusing two of 
his children in Syria, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(c) and (e).37 At trial, the 
defendant argued that the statement of Mark Goldrup, the vice-consul at the 
U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria, was inadmissible hearsay.38 Goldrup said 
that the defendant’s wife “stated that she had been abused by [al-]Maliki.”39 
The court found that the statement did not constitute inadmissible hearsay 
because the government did not offer it to prove the truth of the matter 
 
33.   The Facts About Child Sex Tourism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 29, 2008), https://2001-
2009.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/08/112090.htm.  
34.   Id. (specifically addressing child sex tourism). 
35.   FED. R. EVID. 801. 
36.   United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015). 
37.   Id. at 789–90.   
38.   Id. at 789, 794. 
39.   Id. at 794. 
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asserted, but instead “for the limited purpose of explaining why [Goldrup’s] 
government[al] investigation began.”40 Since it was not offered for the truth 
of the matter asserted, the wife’s statement was admissible.41 Thus, 
prosecutors should always consider whether the statement is offered for some 
other purpose besides proving the truth of the matter asserted. If so, then it 
does not constitute hearsay in the first place and may help to prove that the 
crime occurred.  
Another notable hearsay exception under 801 is 801(d)(2)(E), or the co-
conspirator exception.42 The exception is for statements “offered against an 
opposing party and . . . made by the party’s coconspirator during and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.”43 In United States v. Bianchi, the defendant 
“repeatedly traveled around the world to meet and engage in sexual conduct 
with young boys.”44 The court noted that the defendant had a co-conspirator 
who translated and facilitated the sexual encounters between the defendant 
and the young boys.45  
While the court in Bianchi did not rely upon the co-conspirator exception 
to hearsay, the case provides an example of when a prosecutor could use the 
co-conspirator exception to prove that abuse occurred. Per Giles v. 
California, “[C]ourts may make preliminary findings of this kind. For 
example, where the government charges a defendant with conspiracy, the 
judge is permitted to make an initial finding that the conspiracy existed so as 
to determine whether a statement can be admitted under the co-conspirator 
exception to the hearsay rule.”46 The defendant in Bianchi was charged with 
one count of conspiracy to engage in illicit sexual conduct in foreign placeces 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(e).47 Thus, a judge could have made an initial finding 
that a conspiracy existed based on the charge, and the prosecution could have 
used that to introduce statements the defendant’s co-conspirator made.  
Prosecutors should keep the co-conspirator exception in mind when 
issuing charges against defendants in international sex crime cases. If the 
elements for conspiracy are met, the prosecutor should charge the defendant 
with conspiracy and request that the court make a preliminary finding that 
 
40.   Id. at 794–95 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 
1368, 1371 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
41.   Id. at 794–95.  
42.   FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
43.   Id.  
44.   United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 157 (3d Cir. 2010). 
45.   Id. 
46.   Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 403 (2008). 
47.   Bianchi, 386 Fed. App’x at 157. 
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the conspiracy existed. The prosecutor could then use that finding to rely 
upon the co-conspirator exception to admit the victim’s statements, or 
another’s statements that would support the allegations. 
B.  Federal Rule of Evidence 803: Exceptions to the Rule Against 
Hearsay—Regardless of Whether the Declarant Is Available as a 
Witness 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803, which lists the exceptions that apply 
regardless of the availability of the declarant, provides several key ways to 
admit out-of-court statements. White v. Illinois and United States v. Iron Shell 
provide helpful examples of how prosecutors may rely upon Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803 to admit vital out-of-court statements into evidence. Both 
opinions discuss the excited utterance exception and the medical treatment 
exception.    
In White v. Illinois, the Court found that the prosecution did not have to 
first prove the availability of the victim to admit the victim’s statement, at 
least in regard to the excited utterance and medical treatment and diagnosis 
exceptions.48 The defendant was charged with aggravated criminal sexual 
assault of a four-year-old.49 The babysitter heard the victim scream and went 
to her room.50 The babysitter found S.G.—the victim—and the defendant in 
S.G.’s room, and the defendant then left the house.51 S.G. then told her 
babysitter what had occurred and, thirty minutes later, her mother.52 About 
forty-five minutes after the scream, she told a police officer.53 Four hours after 
the scream, she told medical personnel at the hospital.54  
At trial, the victim did not testify, but the babysitter, mother, police officer, 
emergency room nurse, and doctor testified.55 While the defense objected to 
the testimony of each of the witnesses, claiming their testimony was 
inadmissible hearsay, the trial court found that the statements were 
 
48.   White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 348–49 (1992). The Supreme Court discussed the 
“spontaneous declaration” and “medical examination” exceptions, both exceptions under the 
Illinois Rules of Evidence. Id. at 348, 350 n.1, 351 n.2. The court noted that the spontaneous 
declaration exception is recognized under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), otherwise known 
as the excited utterance exception, and the medical treatment and diagnosis exception is 
recognized under 803(4). Id. at 355 n.8. 
49.   Id. at 349.  
50.   Id.  
51.   Id.  
52.   Id.  
53.   Id.  
54.   White, 502 U.S. at 350. 
55.   Id.  
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admissible under the Illinois hearsay exception for spontaneous 
declarations.56 In regard to medical personnel, both the spontaneous 
declaration exception and medical treatment exception applied.57  
The Court discussed whether the prosecution was required to “produce 
the declarant at trial or [whether] the trial court must find the declarant 
unavailable” before the court admitted statements that fell under a hearsay 
exception.58 Ultimately, the Court held that these procedures were not 
“constitutionally required,” and affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that the 
statements were admissible.59 Thus, the court did not have to first find that 
the victim was unavailable before the statements were admissible under the 
spontaneous declaration and medical examination exceptions.60  
In the case of United States v. Iron Shell the Eighth Circuit was 
predominantly concerned with the medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay 
exception.61 The case involved the sexual assault of a nine-year-old girl, who 
testified at trial, but “was unable to detail what happened after she was 
assaulted by the defendant.”62 The doctor also testified at trial.63 In 
determining the admissibility of the victim’s statements to the doctor, the 
court discussed the history of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), known as the 
medical diagnosis or treatment exception.64 According to the court, the 
modern rule changed the old rule in two ways:  
First, the rule adopted an expansive approach by allowing 
statements concerning past symptoms and those which 
related to the cause of the injury. Second, the rule abolished 
the distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the 
purpose of treatment and an examination for the purpose of 
diagnosis only; the latter usually refers to a doctor who is 
consulted only in order to testify as a witness.65  
The court noted that the victim’s statements fell within the third category of 
803(4), the “inception or general cause of the disease or injury” category, and 
 
56.   Id.  
57.   Id. at 350–51.  
58.   Id. at 348–49. 
59.   Id. at 348–49, 358. 
60.   White, 502 U.S. at 348–49.  
61.   United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 82–85 (8th Cir. 1980). 
62.   Id. at 82. 
63.   Id. at 82–83. 
64.   Id. at 83.  
65.   Id.  
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that the key issue then became whether the statements made were 
“reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”66  
In determining whether the statements were reasonably pertinent, the 
court discussed two key rationales behind the rule.67 First, “[i]t focuses upon 
the patient and relies upon the patient’s strong motive to tell the truth 
because diagnosis or treatment will depend in part upon what the patient 
says. It is thought that the declarant’s motive guarantees trustworthiness 
sufficiently to allow an exception to the hearsay rule.”68 Second, the court 
noted Judge Weinstein’s reasoning: “‘a fact reliable enough to serve as the 
basis for a diagnosis is also reliable enough to escape proscription.’ . . . [L]ife 
and death decisions are made by physicians in reliance on such facts and as 
such should have sufficient trustworthiness to be admissible in a court of 
law.”69 From these rationales, the court established a two-part test to ensure 
that the reasoning behind the exception was upheld: “[F]irst, is the 
declarant’s motive consistent with the purpose of the rule; and second, is it 
reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or 
treatment.”70 
The court first analyzed the victim’s motive, finding that “[t]here [was] 
nothing in the content of the statements to suggest that [the victim] was 
responding to the doctor’s questions for any reason other than promoting 
treatment.”71 The court emphasized that the victim’s statements primarily 
concerned “what happened rather than who assaulted her,” and that while 
“[t]he former in most cases is pertinent to diagnosis and treatment . . . the 
latter would seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related.”72 Finally, the court noted 
that the age of the patient was relevant in determining the admissibility of the 
statements as it “mitigates against a finding that [the victim’s] statements 
were not within the traditional rationale of the rule.”73 Ultimately, every one 
of the victim’s statements was admissible under the test because “they were 
related to her physical condition and were consistent with a motive to 
promote treatment.”74 
 
66.   Id. 
67.   Iron Shell, 633 F.2d. at 83–84. 
68.   Id. (citing Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940)).  
69.   Id. at 84 (quoting 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 
803.125 (Mark S. Brodin, ed., Matthew Bender ed. 1979)).  
70.   Id.  
71.   Id.  
72.   Id.  
73.   Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84. 
74.   Id.  
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The court then discussed the reasonability of the physician relying on the 
information, finding that the doctor’s motive was to “treat [the victim] and 
to preserve any evidence that was available.”75 The court stated:  
It is not dispositive that Dr. Hopkins’ examination would 
have been identical to the one he performed if [the victim] 
had been unable to utter a word. . . . It is enough that the 
information eliminated potential physical problems from 
the doctor’s examination in order to meet the test of 
803(4). . . . Dr. Hopkins also testified, in response to specific 
questions from the court, that most doctors would have 
sought such a history and that he relied upon [the victim’s] 
statements in deciding upon a course of treatment.76 
Ultimately, both the victim’s and the physician’s statements were admissible 
as a statement “made for . . . medical diagnosis or treatment . . . .”77 
White and Iron Shell illustrate how the excited utterance exception and 
medical treatment exception may be used in cases in which child sexual abuse 
has occurred. The holdings of the cases should assist prosecutors in admitting 
out-of-court statements because (a) they will not have to first prove 
unavailability for excited utterance and medical treatment statements,78 and 
(b) they will be able to admit statements to physicians “concerning past 
symptoms and those which related to the cause of the injury,” including 
doctors “consulted only in order to testify as a witness.”79 Prosecutors of 
international sex crimes should especially consider these exceptions.80  
While the specific exceptions discussed in Iron Shell and White will not 
apply in every case, the court’s reasoning sheds light on how prosecutors 
should argue admissibility. Prosecutors should take note of the courts’ 
tendency to reflect upon constitutional requirements,81 the purpose of the 
 
75.   Id. 
76.   Id. at 84–85 (footnote omitted). 
77.   FED. R. EVID. 803(4); see Iron Shell. 633 F.2d at 84–85. 
78.   While Federal Rule of Evidence 803 clearly states that such a finding is not mandatory, 
White v. Illinois provides case law support to the rule as well as an example of its usefulness in 
court. FED. R. EVID. 803; White, 502 U.S. at 348–49, 58.  
79.   Iron Shell, 633 F.2d. at 83; see White, 502 U.S. at 348–49, 358 (1992). 
80.   See discussion infra Section V. 
81.   White, 502 U.S. at 348–49, 358. 
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rule,82 and the motive of the speaker.83 Prosecutors who integrate these 
considerations into their arguments to the court will be far more persuasive. 
C.  Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Exceptions to the Rule Against 
Hearsay—When the Declarant Is Unavailable as a Witness 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 provides exceptions for instances when the 
declarant is unavailable. In order for the hearsay exceptions under 804 to 
apply, the prosecution must first establish that the declarant is unavailable. 
From there, the prosecution argues the specific exceptions under 804 to 
admit the statements.  
Generally speaking, child victims of sexual abuse may be unavailable for 
several reasons. For instance, an inability to remember and a refusal to testify 
“despite a court order” are reasons that the victim could be unavailable under 
804.84 Moreover, an individual who is a non-citizen of the United States may 
be found unavailable because of the inability to “procure” the witness 
through process.85 According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17, “If 
the witness is in a foreign country, 28 U.S.C. § 1783 governs the subpoena’s 
service.”86 However, 28 U.S.C. § 1783 speaks to serving a subpoena on a 
United States citizen, but does not provide process for non-citizens.87 Thus, 
if a non-citizen victim does not come volitionally, prosecutors would be 
unable to “procure” them, and the victim would qualify as an unavailable 
witness under 804(5).88 Once the prosecution establishes that the declarant is 
unavailable, the prosecution must show that one of the hearsay exceptions 
under 804 applies.  
Perhaps one of the most relevant hearsay exceptions for international sex 
crime cases under 804 is 804(b)(6), commonly called the forfeiture 
exception.89 The rule provides that a witness is considered unavailable if the 
witness’s prior statement is “offered against a party that wrongfully caused—
or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a 
witness, and did so intending that result.”90  
 
82.   Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83–84. 
83.   Id. 
84.   FED. R. EVID. 804(a).  
85.   FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5). 
86.   FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)(2).  
87.   28 U.S.C.S. § 1783 (LexisNexis 2020). 
88.   FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5). 
89.   FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).  
90.   Id.  
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United States v. Gurrola provides an example of how the forfeiture 
doctrine may be used successfully in a case involving sexual assault.91 At trial, 
the victim’s statements came in through her brother.92 In Gurrola, the 
defendant argued that the lower court erred in admitting the victim’s 
statements under the forfeiture doctrine.93 More specifically, the defendant 
argued that the Government failed to prove that the defendant in fact caused 
the victim’s unavailability.94 However, the court found that the defendant 
possessed the requisite intent in 804(b)(6), as evidenced in a pre-trial hearing 
conducted on the admissibility of the victim’s statements.95  
In that pre-trial hearing, the case agent testified that two individuals had 
told him that  “Gurrola ordered [the victim] murdered specifically to prevent 
her from testifying.”96 Thus, the court found that because the agent’s 
testimony was “highly probative of [the defendant’s] motive for having [the 
victim]  killed” that was “later confirmed by [a witness] at trial,” the district 
court did not err in admitting the victim’s statements through her brother.97 
The defendant’s direct threats against the victim were sufficient to establish 
his intent to make her unavailable to testify.98 
The policy behind the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, which may 
apply both to hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, is equity.99 In other 
words: “a man shall not profit from his wrongdoing.”100 A perpetrator may 
be found to have caused the witness’s unavailability if the abuse made it 
impossible for the victim to testify. Perpetrators of international sex crimes 
should not benefit from their wrongdoing, nor from the fact that they 
committed the crime overseas, making prosecution more challenging. The 
policy underlying this hearsay exception should assist with the argument that 
if a perpetrator commits a heinous crime against a victim, and that interferes 
with the victim’s ability to be present for trial, their statements should be 
admissible. The prosecutor should seriously consider the forfeiture exception 
 
91.   United States v. Gurrola, 898 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2018). 
92.   Id. at 534. 
93.   Id. 
94.   Id.  
95.   Id. at 534–35. 
96.   Id. at 534. 
97.   Gurrola, 898 F.3d at 534–35.  
98.   Id. at 535. 
99.   See Katie M. McDonough, Comment, Combating Gang-Perpetrated Witness 
Intimidation with Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1283, 1301-04 (2013). 
100.   Id. at 1303.  
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in arguing the admissibility of victims’ statements, despite potential difficulty 
proving that the perpetrator intentionally caused the victim’s unavailability. 
D.   Federal Rule of Evidence 807: Residual Exception 
Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the residual exception,101 is a seldom used 
exception to the bar against hearsay.102 However, there have been instances 
where the courts have admitted statements relying on this exception. The 
exception holds two basic requirements: (1) “the statement is supported by 
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness . . . .”; and (2) “it is more probative 
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the 
proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.”103 In determining whether 
a statement is admissible under the residual exception, courts heavily rely on 
the policies the Federal Rules of Evidence were written to achieve.    
For example, in Doe v. Darien Board of Education, the court found that 
certain statements were admissible under the residual exception.104 In Darien 
Board of Education, the plaintiffs, the victim and his parents, alleged that the 
victim’s paraprofessional aide sexually abused him.105 The plaintiffs offered 
the victim’s parents’ statements, the victim’s psychiatrist’s statements, and a 
Sexual Assault Response Team interview transcript into evidence.106 The 
court discussed the residual exception in its discussion of the admissibility of 
the parents’ statements and the interview transcript.107 In regards to the first 
element of the residual exception, the trustworthiness of the statement, the 
court noted that the United States Supreme Court listed several factors for 
 
101.   FED. R. EVID. 807. 
102.   See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1979) (commenting on 
the rule’s legislative history and cautioning against the over-use of this exception).  
103.   FED. R. EVID. 807. 
104.   Doe v. Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d 386, 402 (D. Conn. 2015). 
105.   Id. at 393. 
106.   Id. at 395–96.  
107.   Id. at 398. For the policies behind the residual exception, see In re Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, No. 11-20059-svk, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 922 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 24, 2015). In 
that decision, the court stated:  
     A residual exception was considered necessary in order (1) [t]o provide 
sufficient flexibility to permit the courts to deal with new and 
unanticipated situations, (2) [t]o preserve the integrity of the specifically 
enumerated exceptions, [and] (3) [t]o facilitate the basic purpose of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence: truth ascertainment and fair adjudication of 
controversies.  
Id. at 22 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1048 (1st Cir. 1997)).  
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determining “whether hearsay statements made by a child witness in child 
sexual abuse cases are reliable.”108 Those factors include: “spontaneity and 
consistent repetition,” “mental state of the declarant,” “use of terminology 
unexpected of a child of similar age,” and “lack of motive to fabricate.”109 
In the court’s analysis in Darien Board of Education, the court noted the 
general consistency of the victim’s testimony, despite small variations,110 the 
statements’ being made “spontaneously, without much prompting or 
questioning,”111 the victim’s ability to lie,112 the victim’s prior accusations of 
abuse,113 and the victim’s behavior after the alleged assault.114 Ultimately, 
given these factors, the court found that the statement satisfied the first 
element of 807.115 
Furthermore, the court found that the statements were “unquestionably 
material”116 and “would be the most probative on what happened” to the 
victim.117 The court also emphasized that the parents would testify as to what 
their son told them, and the jury could determine the credibility of their 
statements.118 Finally, the court found that admitting the victim’s statements 
would best serve the interests of justice and purpose behind the Federal Rules 
of Evidence:  
The propriety of requiring extremely young [or disabled] 
victims of abuse to take the stand as the only method for 
putting before the jury what is, in all probability, the only 
first-hand account of the circumstances of abuse other than 
that of the defendant is debatable. In a more relaxed 
environment, the child in this case was able to provide his 
 
108.   Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 398 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 
821 (1990)). 
109.   Id. (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 821–22). 
110.   Id. at 398–402. 
111.   Id. (citing Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d at 1080 (7th Cir. 1992)).  
112.   Id. at 400.  
113.   Id. The court noted that an allegation of sexual assault would have been “out of 
character” for the victim. Id.  
114.   Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 400.  
115.   Id. at 400–01. 
116.   Id. at 401 (quoting United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979). 
117.   Id. (quoting Brookover v. Mary Hitchcock Mem’l Hosp., 893 F.2d 411, 420 (1st Cir. 
1990)). 
118.   Id.  
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version of the relevant events and yet avoid a potentially 
traumatic courtroom encounter.119  
Therefore, the court found that the victim’s statements would “likely be 
admissible at trial under the residual exception.”120 
In determining whether the residual exception will allow for the 
admittance of a hearsay statement, the court will analyze the elements listed 
in Federal Rule of Evidence 807.121 Perhaps the most compelling argument, 
however, is how the admittance of a statement can achieve the purposes 
behind the rules. According to United States v. Sposito, these purposes 
include “truth ascertainment and fair adjudication of controversies.”122 
Ultimately, the court in Darien Board of Education largely relied upon those 
purposes in its decision.123 
Even if the other, more commonly used hearsay exceptions do not allow 
the statement of a victim into evidence, prosecutors may attempt to use the 
residual exception. While prosecutors may hesitate to argue the admissibility 
under the residual exception because of the uncertainty of its success, without 
a change in the Federal Rules of Evidence, this may be the only option to 
effectively prosecute certain international sex crimes.124  
IV. JUSTICE FOR BOTH SIDES: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, CRAWFORD V. 
WASHINGTON, AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES 
A. The Confrontation Clause and Its Underlying Policies  
When a victim is unable, unwilling, or unavailable to testify, a key issue 
that arises is the defendant’s right to confront the witness. The Sixth 
Amendment ensures the defendant’s right “to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him” in criminal cases.125 Several courts have commented 
on the intent behind and policies supporting the Confrontation Clause.126 
Understanding  courts’ concerns and reasoning regarding the Confrontation 
Clause will help prosecutors know when and how to argue the admissibility 
of statements from victims that do not testify.  
 
119.   Id. (quoting United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 1985)).  
120.   Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 401. 
121.   See FED. R. EVID. 807. 
122.   United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1048 (1st Cir. 1997).  
123.   Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 398. 
124.   See, e.g., State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 674 (N.J. 1988). 
125.   U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
126.   See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49–55 (2004) (and cases cited therein).   
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In the seminal case of Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the Ohio v. Roberts test and held that the testimonial statements 
were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.127 In Crawford, the 
defendant stabbed a man who allegedly attempted to rape his wife.128 The 
defendant’s wife spoke to the police about the stabbing, and at trial, the 
prosecution presented the recording to the jury.129 The defendant had no 
previous opportunity to cross-examine; thus, the issue on appeal was whether 
the admitted evidence violated his constitutional right to confront the 
witness.130 
In determining whether the statement was admissible, the Supreme Court 
analyzed the test in Roberts, which held that a statement may be admissible if 
it “bears ‘adequate indicia of reliability.’”131 In order to determine the validity 
of the test, the Court in Crawford looked to the original intent of the Sixth 
Amendment.132 After surveying the history and policies behind the 
Confrontation Clause, the Court stated that the “principal evil” the 
Confrontation Clause was intended to prevent was “use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused.”133 The Court stated that the 
text of the Confrontation Clause references the right to confront at common 
law, thus limiting its scope to those exceptions present at the time of the 
nation’s inception.134  
The Court in Crawford held that the test in Roberts was invalid and noted 
that a reliability test was insufficient because the Confrontation Clause’s goal 
“is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of 
cross-examination.”135 The Court stated that the main “vice” of the Roberts 
 
127.   Id. at 61, 68.  
128.   Id. at 38. 
129.   Id.  
130.   Id.  
131.   Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 
(1980)). 
132.   Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.  
133.   Id. at 50.  
134.   Id. at 54. The exception present at the time of the nation’s inception was that the 
statements were admissible only if the declarant was unavailable and there was a “prior 
opportunity to cross-examine.” Id. While the Court noted that other exceptions were present 
by 1791, there was little, if any, evidence to support a contention that there was an exception 
to “admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case.” Id. at 56 (emphasis 
removed).  
135.   Id. at 61. 
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test was that it would “admit core testimonial statements that the 
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.”136  
Ultimately, the Court held that the recording was inadmissible and that 
the lower court erred in relying on the Roberts test.137 The statements clearly 
constituted testimonial, as the declarant made them to the police.138 In order 
for a court to admit testimonial statements, the court would have to find the 
witness unavailable and ensure there had been a prior opportunity to cross-
examine.139 Since that was not the case in Crawford, there was a clear bar 
against the statements’ admissibility.140  
If the Court had found that the statements were nontestimonial, they 
would have been admissible.141 The Court did not go into detail about how to 
determine whether or not a statement is testimonial; however, it did state 
that, at a bare minimum, testimonial statements include “prior testimony at 
a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations.”142 After Crawford, the key issue became determining what 
constitutes a testimonial statement.    
B. Determining Testimonial Statements 
While the Court in Crawford did not provide a clear definition of 
testimonial, it did state that it is “typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”143 
Thus, a statement that is not offered to establish or prove some fact would 
not constitute a testimonial statement. The Court in Crawford listed several 
items of evidence that would constitute testimonial statements: “affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to 
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.”144  This list seems to align well 
with the previous definition provided by Crawford, since those items listed 
would be expected to be “made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.”145  
 
136.   Id. at 63.  
137.   Id. at 68–69. 
138.   Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40, 68.  
139.   Id. at 68.  
140.   Id.  
141.   Id.  
142.   Id. 
143.   Id. at 51. 
144.   Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  
145.   Id. (emphasis added). 
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According to the Court in Crawford, statements made during police 
interrogations fit squarely within the realm of testimonial statements.146 In 
Davis v. Washington, the Court further dissected this seemingly clear 
category.147 The Court held that because the interrogation’s “primary purpose 
was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” the 
statements at issue were not testimonial.148 The Court differentiated between 
the primary purpose of testimonial and nontestimonial statements made in 
police interrogations: whereas testimonial statements were made to prove 
“past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,” 
nontestimonial statements were made to “end a threatening situation.”149 
Michigan v. Bryant provides more guidance in determining the primary 
purpose of an interrogation.150 In Bryant, the Supreme Court stated that, in 
determining the primary purpose, one should “objectively evaluate the 
circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the statements and actions 
of the parties.”151 Some of the factors to consider include where the encounter 
occurred (police station or where the crime occurred), when the encounter 
occurred (during the emergency or after), the formality of the interrogation 
(the more formal, the more like testimonial), the victim’s motives behind his 
or her statements, the interrogator’s motives behind his or her statements, 
and the victim’s medical condition.152  
Determining whether an ongoing emergency exists depends on “the type 
and scope of danger posed to the victim, the police, and the public.”153 The 
Court emphasized that the standard for determining the primary purpose is 
objective, or “the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as 
ascertained from the individuals’ statements and actions and circumstances 
in which the encounter occurred.”154 Bryant also stated that “the primary 
purpose of the interrogation will be most accurately ascertained by looking 
to the contents of both the questions and the answers.”155 While the Court 
noted that while an ongoing emergency occurring is not dispositive,156 it is 
 
146.   Id. at 68.  
147.   Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006). 
148.   Id.  
149.   Id. at 822, 832.  
150.   Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 359 (2011). 
151.   Id.  
152.   Id. at 360, 364–66, 368. 
153.   Id. at 370–71. 
154.   Id. at 360.  
155.   Id. at 367–68.  
156.   Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366.  
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“among the most important circumstances informing the ‘primary purpose’ 
of an interrogation.”157  
Another part of determining whether a statement is testimonial is the 
defendant’s conduct. In Giles v. California, the Court discussed the common 
law forfeiture doctrine by wrongdoing.158 This doctrine permits admission of 
statements of “a witness who was ‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or 
procurement’ of the defendant.”159 The majority held that “[t]he terms used 
to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied 
only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness 
from testifying.”160 In other words, the defendant had to cause the witness’s 
unavailability with the purpose of “prevent[ing] the person from 
testifying.”161 The Court vacated and remanded the case to determine the 
defendant’s intent.162 
Thomas D. Lyon contributed to an amicus brief in support of the 
respondent in Giles.163 In an article written by Lyon and Julia A. Dente, they 
observe that “[a] majority of the Court expressed the view that repeated acts 
of domestic violence against the declarant should suffice to prove that her 
murder was motivated by a desire to control the declarant and render her 
unavailable.”164 As Lyon and Dente argue, “The Giles opinion provides an 
opportunity to apply the forfeiture doctrine to the special challenges facing 
the prosecution in child-witness cases.”165 More specifically, they argue in 
their article that “forfeiture should apply if the defendant exploited a child’s 
vulnerabilities such that he could reasonably anticipate that the child would 
be unavailable to testify.”166 While mere commentary on the case, perhaps 
prosecutors could adopt and apply this reasoning to certain international sex 
crime cases, where it would be reasonably foreseeable that due to the 
defendant’s abuse of the child, the child would be unavailable to testify.   
Collectively, these cases help frame an analysis for determining whether a 
statement is testimonial. By using the factors outlined in Michigan v. Bryant, 
 
157.   Id. at 361. 
158.   Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008). 
159.   Id.  
160.   Id. at 359. 
161.   Id. at 361. 
162.   Id. at 377.  
163.   Thomas D. Lyon & Julia A. Dente, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 102 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1181 (2012). 
164.   Id. at 1184 (citing Giles, 554 U.S. at 377).  
165.   Id. at 1184–85.  
166.   Id. at 1185. 
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one will be able to determine what the primary purpose is behind a 
statement.167 Ultimately, if the primary purpose is to help with an “on-going 
emergency,” then the statement will not constitute a testimonial statement.168 
Moreover, under the forfeiture exception, if defendants act to cause the 
victim’s unavailability, they forfeit their right to confront. Thus, prosecutors 
addressing Confrontation Clause issues must first address whether the 
statement is in fact testimonial, and if so, whether or not the doctrine of 
forfeiture applies.  
C. How Ohio v. Clark Changed the Confrontation Clause Analysis  
The Court in Ohio v. Clark focused on the first step of analysis: Whether a 
statement constitutes testimonial.169 More specifically, the Court in Clark 
addressed the issue: “[W]hether statements to persons other than law 
enforcement officers are subject to the Confrontation Clause.”170 The victim, 
a three-year-old, was unavailable because of her age.171 The teacher to whom 
the three-year-old made statements to testified in his stead, and despite the 
defendant’s objections, the Court held that the statements were not 
testimonial and thus did not violate the Confrontation Clause because 
“neither the child nor his teachers had the primary purpose of assisting in 
Clark’s prosecution.”172  
In determining the primary purpose of the statements, the Court noted 
that the statements were made “in the context of an ongoing emergency” and 
the teachers’ primary concern was to ensure the child’s safety.173 The Court 
also pointed out that the conversation between the victim and his teachers 
were “informal and spontaneous,” as the teachers asked him about the 
injuries “immediately upon discovering them” in the lunchroom and 
classroom.174 Thus, the Court used some of the factors outlined in Michigan 
v. Bryant, such as the formality of the conversation, where the conversation 
occurred, when the conversation occurred, and the interrogator’s motives 
 
167.   Bryant, 562 U.S. at 360, 364–68, 371.   
168.   Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
169.   Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2177 (2015). 
170.   Id. at 2181. 
171.   Id. at 2177–78.   
172.   Id. at 2177.   
173.   Id. at 2176. 
174.   Id. at 2181. 
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behind their statements.175 Moreover, the Court mentioned the victim’s 
medical condition, the marks of abuse, in its analysis.176  
The Court in Clark noted that it was “extremely unlikely that a 3-year-old 
child in L.P.’s position would intend his statements to be a substitute for trial 
testimony,” but rather, “a young child in these circumstances would simply 
want the abuse to end, would want to protect other victims, or would have 
no discernible purpose at all.”177 The Court held: “Statements by very young 
children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.”178 The Court 
also stated: “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged 
with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less 
likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.”179  
Finally, the Court stated that it was “irrelevant that the teachers’ questions 
and their duty to report the matter had the natural tendency to result in [the 
defendant’s] prosecution.”180 Thus, the Court in Clark focused on the 
primary purpose of the statements when the declarant made them.181 The 
primary purpose did not change simply because prosecutors offered them 
into evidence later.182 Clark’s holding proves instrumental for prosecutors of 
international sex crimes because it applies the Bryant factors to an instance 
of child sex abuse, while clarifying that the ultimate use of the statement does 
not alter its primary purpose.  
 
 
 
 
175.   Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181. 
176.   Id. 
177.   Id. at 2182. 
178.   Id.  
179.   Id.  
180.   Id. The defendant also argued that since the teachers were mandated reporters, the 
court should find that their statements were testimonial. at 2182–83. However, the Court 
found that “the teachers’ pressing concern was to protect [the victim] and remove him from 
harm’s way” and that “they undoubtedly would have acted with the same purpose” regardless 
of whether they had been mandated to report by state-law. Id. at 2183. The court noted that 
“mandatory reporting statutes alone cannot convert a conversation between a concerned 
teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission aimed primarily at gathering evidence 
for a prosecution.” Id.  
181.   Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183. 
182.   Id. 
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V. BUT WHAT IF THEY WEREN’T THERE?: APPLICATION OF HEARSAY AND 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PRECEDENT TO A SITUATION WHERE THE 
VICTIM DOES NOT TESTIFY 
In United States v. Durham, the victims were able to testify.183 However, in 
hypothesizing that they were not, the case provides a helpful example to 
analyze hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues in an international sex 
crime case. The below analysis considers what the author believes are relevant 
hearsay exceptions and notable Confrontation Clause arguments to an 
instance of international sex abuse perpetrated against a minor.   
The victims’ statements to Wambugo likely would have been admissible 
at trial, even if the victims chose not to testify, or were unavailable.184 After 
Wambugo walked into the girls’ bedroom and saw Durham lying on a bed 
with one of the girls, Durham left and Wambugo immediately spoke with the 
girls.185 This conversation, where the girls told Wambugo they had been 
“doing bad manners” with Durham, would most likely have been admissible 
under the “present sense impression” exception. A present sense impression 
is “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while 
or immediately after the declarant perceived it.”186 The girls made the 
statements immediately after they perceived Durham’s actions. The “excited 
utterance” exception could also apply since the abuse had happened recently 
and the girls were still “under the stress of excitement that it caused.”187  
The utility of these exceptions is limited, especially in instances in which 
the abuse has been occurring over a substantial length of time. In regard to 
the present sense impression, the defense may argue that any statement that 
refers to abuse that did not occur while or immediately after it was perceived 
is inadmissible under the present sense impression exception. Moreover, in 
terms of the excited utterance exception, prosecutors must prepare 
themselves for the argument that because a sufficient amount of time has 
passed, the declarant cannot claim they are still under the stress of the 
 
183.   United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1191 (10th Cir. 2018).  
184.   First of all, regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 801, the prosecution would offer the 
statements that the girls made directly after the abuse for the truth of the matter asserted. FED. 
R. EVID. 801. More specifically, the prosecutor would want the statement “doing bad manners” 
to be entered for the truth, since the issue at trial was whether or not there was abuse. Durham, 
902 F.3d at 1190. However, this first step is always important to consider, because if the 
statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it does not constitute hearsay and 
is admissible. FED. R. EVID. 801. 
185.   Id. 
186.   FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
187.   FED. R. EVID. 803(2).  
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excitement the incident caused. Prosecutors should look to evidence relating 
to the effect of abuse on victims, which could potentially support an 
argument that even though the referenced abuse occurred a while ago the 
victim was still under the “stress of excitement that it caused” when he or she 
made the statement.188  
Other hearsay exceptions could come into play in this hypothetical. For 
instance, the medical treatment exception could apply. Indeed, in Durham, a 
doctor testified as to the victims’ physical state.189 The girls were examined 
six days after Wambugo discovered the abuse.190 However, it is unclear from 
the case what exactly occurred on the date Wambugo found Durham laying 
with one of the girls. The acts he confessed to, namely, molesting and raping 
the girls, occurred on several occasions.191 While the doctor in Durham did 
not share any of the statements of the victims, this exception could prove very 
helpful in international sex crime cases in which the victim does share 
information with the doctor. Of course, as articulated in Iron Shell, the court 
will examine the motives of the victim and the doctor to determine whether 
to allow the doctor to share these statements.192 However, prosecutors should 
utilize this exception if possible. Even if a medical exam has not been done, 
 
188.   Id.; see, e.g., Susanne Babbel, Trauma: Childhood Sexual Abuse, PSYCHOL. TODAY 
(Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/somatic-
psychology/201303/trauma-childhood-sexual-abuse (“With childhood sexual abuse, victims 
are often too young to know how to express what is happening and seek out help. When not 
properly treated, this can result in a lifetime of PTSD, depression, and anxiety.”); see also 
Melissa Hamilton, The Reliability of Assault Victims’ Immediate Accounts: Evidence from 
Trauma Studies, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 277 (2015). Hamilton explains: 
Courts have accepted excited utterances delivered quite some time after 
a trauma. In one case, the court admitted as an excited utterance the 
victim’s statements made to a neighbor two hours after the final assault, 
as the beatings were repeated overnight and the victim was crying and 
hysterical at the time of the utterance. In another case, the victim’s story 
asserted ten hours after her sexual assault was admitted as the victim’s 
unusual behavior between the assault and the statement indicated a 
continued state of stress. A variation has arisen though it remains 
controversial; it is nicknamed the “re-excited” utterance exemption and 
applies when the declarant makes a statement upon being reminded of the 
earlier startling event, such as from watching a movie or reading a news 
article with related themes. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
189.   Durham, 902 F.3d at 1219. 
190.   Id. at 1191. 
191.   Id. at 1190–91.  
192.   United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d. 77, 83–84 (8th Cir. 1980). 
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the prosecutor should consider having a doctor examine the victim (if 
possible). After Iron Shell, even if the doctor is examining the witness for the 
purposes of testifying at trial, they may still fall under the exception to the bar 
against hearsay.193 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 may also prove helpful in an international 
sex crime case. Perhaps most significant of the exceptions under 804 is the 
exception for former testimony.194 If a prosecutor is unable to convince a 
child to testify in court, they may be able to hold a deposition, or other 
hearing specified in the rule, and present that at trial. In the case of Durham, 
if the victims were unavailable, the prosecutor could have arranged for 
depositions of the girls, or, if only a few could make the trip, retain 
depositions of the others.  
While typically not often relied upon, the residual exception has unique 
applicability for child sex abuse cases. In Doe v. Darien Board of Education, 
allowing children to share what happened to them in a more “relaxed 
environment,” thus avoiding a “potentially traumatic courtroom encounter,” 
was a compelling reason to hold that allowing the victim’s statements into 
evidence without them testifying best served the interests of justice.195 Of 
course, prosecutors must consider other elements, including whether the 
statement is trustworthy, whether it is “offered as evidence of a material fact,” 
and whether it is “more probative on the point for which it is offered than 
any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable 
efforts.”196 The prosecutor should not have much trouble proving the 
materiality and probativeness of the statement, in most instances, as the 
victim’s testimony is often the key element of evidence in the case.197  
The largest hurdle for the admissibility of a statement under the residual 
statement, then, seems to be the statement’s trustworthiness.198 This analysis 
will differ in each case and will involve a variety of factors, including 
consistency and spontaneity.199 The prosecutor must undergo a fact-intensive 
inquiry, which may prove difficult, but, given the residual exception’s success 
 
193.   Id. at 84. 
194.   FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Note, however, that the Confrontation Clause will still be 
implicated. 
195.   Doe v. Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d 386, 401 (D. Conn. 2015) (quoting United 
States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
196.   Id. at 398 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 807).  
197.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 672–73 (N.J. 1988).  
198.   Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 398 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 807).  
199.   Id. 
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in Darien Board of Education, the prosecutor should at least consider making 
the argument.200  
In regard to Confrontation Clause concerns, the prosecutor must first 
determine whether the statement is testimonial. In the Durham hypothetical, 
the prosecutor could have made a strong argument that the declarant did not 
make the statement for prosecution, but to preserve the safety of the young 
girls at Upendo Children’s Home. The court would have considered the 
factors outlined in Michigan v. Bryant and applied in Ohio v. Clark.201 First, 
an on-going emergency concerning child abuse existed, as in Clark.202  
Wambugo found Durham in the girls’ room and lying on one of their beds.203 
The conversation in which the girls confessed that “bad manners” had 
occurred happened directly after this discovery.204 Similar to the teacher’s 
primary purpose of safety in Clark, in Durham, Wambugo needed to discover 
whether the girls staying in the Children’s Home were safe.205 Finally, the 
conversation was “informal and spontaneous,” as in Clark, as it occurred in 
the girls’ room in the Children’s Home and immediately after Wambugo saw 
Durham on one of the girls’ beds.206 Thus, regarding the girls’ statements, 
admitting them at trial, even without the girls taking the stand, should not 
have violated the Confrontation Clause.207 
If, for some reason, the statements were determined to be  testimonial, the 
prosecutor should consider the forfeiture exception. As Lyon and Dente 
propose: “forfeiture should apply if the defendant exploited a child’s 
vulnerabilities such that he could reasonably anticipate that the child would 
be unavailable to testify.”208 While the success of this argument is uncertain, 
the Supreme Court’s commentary on domestic violence and the forfeiture 
doctrine in Giles provides some insight that in the future, arguing the 
 
200.   Id. at 401. 
201.   For the list of factors, see Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358–68 (2011), as applied 
in Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2177, 2181 (2015). 
202.   Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.  
203.   United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2018). 
204.   Id.  
205.   Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181; Durham, 902 F.3d at 1190. 
206.   Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181; Durham, 902 F.3d at 1190. 
207.   While this article focuses on the statements of the victim, the statements of Durham, 
including the statements that were recorded and written down, would likely have been 
admissible under the opposing part statement exception. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). Since 
Durham was present at trial, the Confrontation Clause would be satisfied. United States v. 
Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1191 (10th Cir. 2018); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
208.   Thomas D. Lyon & Julia A. Dente, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 102 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1185 (2012). 
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forfeiture exception in an international sex crime case involving a child may 
prove beneficial.209 
Ultimately, simply because a victim does not testify does not hand the 
defendant a “Get Out of Jail Free” card. The current Confrontation Clause 
case law provides avenues for prosecutors to offer statements into evidence 
without violating the defendant’s Constitutional rights. By looking at the 
history and purpose behind the defendant’s Constitutional rights protected 
by the Sixth Amendment, prosecutors can understand how to effectively 
argue the admissibility of statements, while respecting the defendant’s 
Constitutional rights.  
Every case poses distinct challenges, and in some cases, the victim may 
make no statement whatsoever. However, the analysis above demonstrates 
that prosecutors should not veer away from cases in which the victim is 
unable to testify. Rather, they should consider every avenue available to admit 
evidence in order to prosecute these heinous crimes. However, there are sure 
to be instances in which the victim does not testify and the hearsay 
exceptions, other than perhaps the residual exception, do not apply. For those 
instances, the legislature should consider creating a new hearsay exception 
specifically for cases involving international sex crimes perpetrated against 
children.  
VI. GETTING CREATIVE: A NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
A.   The Tender Years Exception   
If the purpose behind the hearsay rules is to achieve justice and truth, as 
has been claimed,210 then prosecutors should use the exceptions to further 
those goals. When the hearsay exceptions, including the residual exception, 
prove insufficient to admit critical statements, the legislature should consider 
another means to ensure that justice and truth prevail.  
 In State v. D.R., the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted one such 
hearsay exception.211 The victim in the case was the two-and-one-half-year-
old granddaughter of the defendant.212 The New Jersey Division of Youth and 
Family Services questioned the victim and recorded her responses, which the 
jury heard at trial.213 While the trial court found that the victim was 
unavailable to testify, a clinical psychologist, who had interviewed the victim 
 
209.   Id. at 1184 (citing Giles, 554 U.S. at 377). 
210.   United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1048 (1st Cir. 1997).  
211.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 682–83 app. A (N.J. 1988).  
212.   Id. at 668. 
213.   Id. at 669. 
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three times, testified.214 He stated that the sexual assault caused the victim’s 
post-traumatic stress disorder.215 Moreover, the psychologist testified that the 
victim expressed anxiety and fear as she used dolls to act out a sexual 
assault.216 
 The defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, 
and endangering the welfare of a child.217 The appellate court found that the 
psychologist’s expert testimony was “sufficient, even without the victim’s 
incriminatory statements, to constitute independent corroborative proof 
adequate to sustain defendant’s conviction.”218 However, the court found that 
the statements the victim made to the psychologist were hearsay and not 
admissible under any recognized hearsay exception.219 In recognition of the 
limitation this posed, the appellate court “acknowledged the need for an 
exception that would allow into evidence, under certain conditions, 
testimony of out-of-court statements made by a young child relating acts of 
sexual abuse.”220 
The court noted that “[c]ourts,  legislatures, and commentators that have 
focused on the problems of proof in child sex abuse prosecutions appear to 
agree that testimony by the victim is often the indispensable element of the 
prosecution’s case.”221 Reasons for this recognition include the fact that 
oftentimes the perpetrator is someone the victim or the family knows and 
trusts. Usually, there are no witnesses, and “[f]requently, there is no visible 
physical evidence that acts of sexual molestation have occurred.”222 Thus, 
“[a]bsent a confession, the victim’s account of the sexual abuse may be the 
best and sometimes the only evidence that a sexual assault has taken place.”223 
Moreover, the court recognized that in-court testimony of child victims may 
be less reliable than out-of-court statements because of “the stress of the 
courtroom experience, the presence of the defendant, and the prosecutor’s 
 
214.   Id.  
215.   Id.  
216.   Id. at 670–71. 
217.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 671.  
218.   Id. 
219.   Id.  
220.   Id.  
221.   Id. at 672 (citing State v. R.W., 514 A.2d 1287, 1287–88 (N.J. 1986). 
222.   Id.  
223.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 672. 
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need to resort to leading questions.”224 The court also noted that the passage 
of time may impede the child’s memory and since many perpetrators are 
trusted family or friends, “the victim may be urged or coerced to recant.”225  
The court referenced a study conducted by the American Bar 
Association’s National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and 
Protection, noting the study’s recommendations support the admissibility of 
child victims’ out-of-court statements of sexual abuse:  
[W]here it does not qualify under an existing hearsay 
exception, as long as: (1) the child testifies; or (2) in the event 
the child does not testify, there is other corroborative 
evidence of the abuse. In support of its proposal, the 
Recommendations rely on the general trustworthiness of 
children’s complaints concerning sexual abuse, the pressing 
need for such evidence, inadequacy of existing hearsay 
exceptions to permit admission of such statements, and the 
tendency of courts to invoke tortured interpretations of the 
“excited utterance” exception in order to sustain 
admissibility of a child’s out-of-court statement.226  
In the ABA study, the commission noted that in the states of Kansas and 
Washington, “legislation has been pro-posed or enacted creating a special 
exception specifically for the admission of children’s statements of sexual 
abuse.”227 Indeed, Washington was the first state to adopt a statute allowing 
these statements,228 and other states modeled their statutes after 
 
224.   Id. at 673. Victor I. Vieth has commented on this difficult experience and advocated 
for having individuals present to support the victim. Victor I. Vieth, Keeping Faith: The 
Potential Role of a Chaplain to Address the Spiritual Needs of Maltreated Children and Advise 
Child Abuse Multi-Disciplinary Teams, 14 LIBERTY UNIV. L. REV. 351, 364–65 (2020).  
Specifically, in cases of child abuse in the church, Vieth comments that having a theologian or 
chaplain present could be of immense help to the victim in navigating the process. Id.  
225.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 672. 
226.  Id. at 673–74 (citations omitted) (quoting NAT’L LEGAL RES. CTR. FOR CHILD 
ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION ET AL., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL  
INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE CASES 34–36 (J. Bulkley ed. 1982), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/87385NCJRS.pdf.). 
227.   NAT’L LEGAL RES. CTR. FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION ET AL., 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE CAS
ES 35 (J. Bulkley ed. 1982), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/87385NCJRS.pdf. 
[hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS]). 
228.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 674. 
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Washington’s.229 Even in circumstances without a legislative exception, the 
court noted how other courts had admitted similar statements under the 
residual hearsay exception.230 
Based on this analysis, the court found that such a hearsay exception was 
“necessary and appropriate.”231 The court reasoned that the exception would 
“enable the judicial system to deal more sensibly and effectively with the 
difficult problems of proof inherent in child sex abuse prosecutions.”232 The 
adopted hearsay exception reads:  
     A statement by a child under the age of 12 relating to a 
sexual offense under the Code of Criminal Justice 
committed on, with, or against that child is admissible in a 
criminal proceeding brought against a defendant for the 
commission of such offense if (a) the proponent of the 
statement makes known to the adverse party his intention to 
offer the statement and the particulars of the statement at 
such time as to provide him with a fair opportunity to 
prepare to meet it; (b) the court finds, in a hearing conducted 
pursuant to Rule 8(1), that on the basis of the time, content, 
and circumstances of the statement there is a probability that 
the statement is trustworthy; and (c) either (i) the child 
testifies at the proceeding, or (ii) the child is unavailable as a 
witness and there is offered admissible evidence 
corroborating the act of sexual abuse; provided that no child 
whose statement is to be offered in evidence pursuant to this 
rule shall be disqualified to be a witness in such proceeding 
by virtue of the requirements of paragraph (b) of Rule 17.233 
The exception only applied to those under the age of twelve234 and only 
applied to criminal cases. The court’s reference to Rule 8(1) would translate 
 
229.   Id. (noting Florida, Indiana, Minnesota, South Dakota, Utah, Colorado, and Georgia 
as examples modeling their hearsay exceptions on Washington’s statute).  
230.   Id. 
231.   Id. at 675.  
232.   Id.  
233.   Id. at 683; see also R.S. v. Knighton, 592 A.2d 1157, 1163–64 (N.J. 1991). The author 
of this Note cound not find a direct comparison between N.J. Evid. R. 17(b) and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. If the federal courts adopted this exception, the qualifications for the 
witness would be determined by Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
234.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 683. In contrast, Washington’s statute applies to children 
under ten, but also includes an exception for individuals under 16 years old who make a 
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to Federal Rule of Evidence 104, Preliminary Questions.235 The exception 
itself provides parameters for when these statements may be admissible. As 
outlined below, the court considered both the policies behind the hearsay 
exceptions as well as the Constitutional concerns behind the Confrontation 
Clause in adopting the Tender Years Exception.  
B.   The Tender Years Exception and Hearsay Policies  
Essentially, the Tender Years Exception is a glorified residual exception 
that applies to child victims of sexual abuse. Just as the residual exception 
does, it requires notice and that the statement have a probability of 
trustworthiness.236 Given the nature of cases to which the Tender Years 
Exception applies, where typically the victim’s statements are the key pieces 
of evidence in the case, the probative value of the statement should not prove 
difficult to establish.237 Moreover, the Tender Years Exception’s  requirement 
of a “probability” of trustworthiness echoes the residual exception’s 
requirement of “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.”238  
Currently, the statute reads that the court must find that “on the basis of 
the time, content, and circumstances of the statement there is a probability 
that the statement is trustworthy . . . .”239 As with other hearsay exceptions, 
the closer that the statement is made to the occurrence of abuse, the more 
reliable it is. While the statement may not be close in time enough to 
constitute a present sense impression or an excited utterance, if the statement 
is made relatively close to the abuse, and the other factors are indicative of 
reliability, then the court could find the statement trustworthy.  
In terms of content, the court in State v. D.R. claimed that “[y]oung 
children, having no sexual orientation, do not necessarily regard a sexual 
encounter as shocking or unpleasant, and frequently relate such incidents to 
 
statement “describing any of the following acts or attempted acts performed with or on the 
child: Trafficking under RCW 9A.40.100; commercial sexual abuse of a minor under RCW 
9.68A.100; promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor under RCW 9.68A.101; or 
promoting travel for commercial sexual abuse of a minor under RCW 9.68A.102 . . . .” WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (LexisNexis 2019). 
235.   See N.J. R. EVID. 104 cmt. (commenting that “[t]he subject matter covered by 
paragraph (a) of Fed. R. Evid. 104 is substantially the same as that covered by N.J. Evid. R. 
8(1).”). 
236.   FED. R. EVID. 807.  
237.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 672–73 (N.J. 1988).  
238.   Compare State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 682–83 app. A (N.J. 1988), with FED. R. EVID. 
807. 
239.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 683 (N.J. 1988). 
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a parent or relative in a matter-of-fact manner.”240 The actual words that the 
children use could also support a finding of trustworthiness. For instance, in 
Durham, the children’s use of the words “bad manners,” rather than a specific 
description of a sex act, lends to the reliability of their statement as their 
choice of words shows that they were simply trying to describe what had 
occurred, which lends to the statement’s trustworthiness.241  
The circumstances of the statement also lend to determining its reliability, 
as circumstances can indicate the speaker’s motive for making the statement. 
As discussed above, in Durham the circumstances made it clear that Ms. 
Wambugo’s motive was to protect the girls.242 Moreover, the circumstances 
of the statement—Ms. Wambugo walking in on Durham lying with the girls, 
Ms. Wambugo asking the girls what had occurred, and the girls responding 
immediately—indicate that the motive of the speakers was simply to answer 
the questions of Ms. Wambugo.243 Their choice of words (“bad manners”) 
also indicates that they assumed some of the fault.244 These circumstances 
indicate that the motive of the speakers was not for future prosecution, but 
to simply respond to questions of Ms. Wambugo. These facts support the 
statement’s trustworthiness.  
Not all situations are as clear as the case of Durham, however, and it will 
not always prove easy to determine the motive of the speaker and listener. 
The Tender Years Exception must provide more than a glorified residual 
exception if it is going to help prosecutors try these cases. While the residual 
exception provides an option to prosecutors, it has proven less than helpful 
because it is too broad. In order for the Tender Years Exception to prove 
effective, it must have stricter requirements beyond mandating the court to 
consider the content, time, and circumstances of the statement. The court in 
Doe v. Darien Board of Education used multiple factors to determine the 
trustworthiness of the statement under the residual exception.245 Adding 
these factors to the Tender Years Exception will assist courts in their 
determination of whether or not a statement is trustworthy. As the Tender 
Years Exception is a type of specialized residual exception, the application of 
the factors to this exception makes pragmatic and logical sense.  
 
 
240.   Id. at 673.  
241.   United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2018). 
242.   See discussion supra Section V. 
243.   Durham, 902 F.3d at 1190. 
244.   Id.  
245.   Darien Bd. of Educ., 110 F. Supp. 3d at 398–402. 
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C.   The Tender Years Exception and Confrontation Clause Concerns    
 Adopting the Tender Years Exception poses significant Confrontation 
Clause concerns, and rightfully so. Advocacy for one individual’s access to 
justice should not inhibit another’s access. With that in mind, and as noted 
above, courts will look to the primary purpose of a statement to determine 
whether it is testimonial. If the statements are not testimonial then the 
statements do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.  
The New Jersey legislature drafted the Tender Years Exception before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington.246 After Crawford, 
mere reliability was not sufficient to admit out-of-court statements without 
the defendant being able to confront.247 However, even with this alteration in 
case law, Ohio v. Clark provides an example in which a court may still admit 
statements by a victim because they are not testimonial.248 Courts with similar 
exceptions to New Jersey’s have responded in various ways, and 
demonstrated that the exception may still be adopted and used, as long as the 
statement is not testimonial.249 Moreover, if the forfeiture exception applies, 
the court may admit the statement without violating the Confrontation 
Clause.250 
While the change in case law regarding the Confrontation Clause affects 
the application of the Tender Years Exception, the exception still provides a 
valuable tool in allowing child victim’s statements into evidence. If the 
statement does not constitute testimonial, or fits under the forfeiture 
exception, than the exception could apply. Because the Confrontation Clause 
would have the ability to bar the utility of the exception in certain cases, 
prosecutors should first and foremost address Confrontation Clause 
concerns before addressing the applicability of the Tender Years Exception. 
 
 
 
246.   The court decided State v. D.R. in 1988, but the Supreme Court did not issue its 
opinion in Crawford v. Washington until 2004. State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667 (1988); Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
247.   Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60, 67–69 (2004). 
248.   Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2177 (2015). 
     249.   See, e.g., Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So. 2d 66, 68–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). In 
Herrera-Vega, a statute similar to the Tender Years Exception was involved. Id. at 67; FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (LexisNexis 2019). The Supreme Court of Florida had relied on Ohio 
v. Roberts, rather than Crawford v. Washington, in its holding that the Florida statute satisfied 
Confrontation Clause requirements. Id. at 68. However, because the statements were not 
testimonial, Crawford did “not entitle [the defendant] to any relief.” Id. at 68–69. 
     250.   Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008). 
342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd   168 5/13/20   7:35 AM
2020]              IT’S NOT A “GET OUT OF JAIL FREE” CARD          443 
 
D. Expanding the Tender Years Exception to International Sex Crimes  
The key reason behind adopting a hearsay exception for child victims of 
abuse applies to victims of international sex crimes. Even if physical evidence 
exists, it may be extremely difficult to obtain. Thus, similar to the court’s 
reasoning in State v. D.R., “[a]bsent a confession, the victim’s account of the 
sexual abuse may be the best and sometimes the only evidence that a sexual 
assault has taken place.”251  
Congress would have to make changes to the Tender Years Exception in 
order to effectively promote justice for all child victims of international sex 
crimes. For instance, Congress would broaden the scope of applicability to 
crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 2423. Moreover, the age requirement should be 
increased to include all minors. Currently, the exception applies to children 
under twelve.252 Notably, Washington’s comparable statute has a provision 
for children under sixteen.253 While some may posit that older children’s 
statements are less reliable than younger children’s statements, the 
exception’s requirement for corroborating evidence helps protect against 
unreliable statements.254  
As explained above, the exception would include a list of factors in order 
to provide parameters for the court in determining the reliability of the 
statement. One of the factors would be the relationship between the declarant 
and the listener. When the listener has a responsibility for the child’s safety 
and wellbeing, similar rationales underlying the medical treatment would 
support the admission of the statement. Statements under the medical 
treatment exception are excepted from the hearsay ban because of the 
assumption that medical professionsals are merely trying to gain information 
to ultimately treat and protect the child.255 Individuals who are in charge of a 
child’s wellbeing, such as teachers, counselors, supervisors, and caregivers, 
typically have similar motives in asking children questions.256 Of course, this 
is only one additional factor to consider in light of the others listed.  
 
251.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 672. 
252.   Id. at 683 app. A. 
253.   WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (LexisNexis 2019). 
254.   State v. D.R., 537 A.2d at 683 app. A. 
255.   Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84 (noting that the doctor’s motive was to “treat [the victim] 
and to preserve any evidence that was available.”). 
256.   For example, the teacher’s motive in Ohio v. Clark was to ensure the child’s safety. 
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2183 (2015). Similarly, the supervisor of the home in Durham 
simply wanted to discover what had occurred and protect the girls. United States v. Durham, 
902 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2018); see discussion supra Section V.  
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With these edits, and a few other minor ones, the exception would read as 
follows:  
     A statement by a child under the age of 18 relating to a 
sexual offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2423 committed on, with, 
or against that child is admissible in a criminal proceeding 
brought against a defendant for the commission of such 
offense if the following three requirements are met. First, the 
proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse 
party his intention to offer the statement and the particulars 
of the statement at such time as to provide him with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it. Second, the court finds, in 
a hearing conducted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 
104, that on the basis of the time, content, and circumstances 
of the statement there is a probability that the statement is 
trustworthy. Third, either (a) the child testifies at the 
proceeding, or (b) the child is unavailable as a witness under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 804, the statement is non-
testimonial [or the forfeiture exception applies], and there is 
offered admissible evidence corroborating the act of sexual 
abuse. This exception is based on the contingency that no 
child whose statement is to be offered in evidence pursuant 
to this rule shall be disqualified to be a witness in such 
proceeding by virtue of the requirements of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  
     In determining the trustworthiness of the statement, the 
court shall consider the following factors: the spontaneity of 
the statement, the consistency of the statement(s), the 
mental state of the declarant, the use of terminology 
unexpected of a child of similar age, the declarant’s ability to 
lie, the declarant’s prior accusations of abuse, the declarant’s 
behavior after the alleged assault, whether or not the 
declarant had a motive to fabricate, and the declarant’s 
relationship to the listener. The statement has greater indicia 
of reliability when it is made to an individual who has a 
responsibility for the child’s safety and wellbeing, such as a 
medical professional, counselor, teacher, supervisor, or 
caregiver, rather than a family member or peer.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
While the hurdles of prosecuting international sex crimes seem daunting, 
they should not cause prosecutors to hesitate to the point where they fail to 
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prosecute the crime at all. As this Note has demonstrated, current hearsay 
exceptions and Confrontation Clause case law provide various avenues 
through which prosecutors can admit vital statements made by victims. 
However, they may prove insufficient to prosecute international sex crimes 
effectively. When current hearsay exceptions run into a dead end, the 
legislature should consider a new avenue by which to promote the goals of 
justice and truth the exceptions were founded upon. 
By adopting a new hearsay exception based on the New Jersey Tender 
Years Exception, the legislature would ensure the implementation of the 
policies behind the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Constitution. But the 
adoption of this hearsay exception would do more than that. It would send a 
message to perpetrators that leaving the borders of the United States does not 
hand them a “Get Out of Jail Free” card. 
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